From impediment to adaptation: Chinese investments in Myanmar's new regulatory environment by Zhang, Youyi & Mark, SiuSue
www.ssoar.info
From impediment to adaptation: Chinese
investments in Myanmar's new regulatory
environment
Zhang, Youyi; Mark, SiuSue
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Zhang, Y., & Mark, S. (2017). From impediment to adaptation: Chinese investments in Myanmar's new
regulatory environment. Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 36(2), 71-100. https://nbn-resolving.org/
urn:nbn:de:gbv:18-4-10625
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-ND Lizenz (Namensnennung-
Keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu
den CC-Lizenzen finden Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/3.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY-ND Licence
(Attribution-NoDerivatives). For more Information see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/3.0
Journal of Current 
Southeast Asian Affairs 
 
 
 
 
Mark, SiuSue and Youyi Zhang (2017), From Impediment to Adaptation: Chinese 
Investments in Myanmar’s New Regulatory Environment, in: Journal of Current 
Southeast Asian Affairs, 36, 2, 71–100. 
 
URN: http://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:gbv:18-4-10625 
 
ISSN: 1868-4882 (online), ISSN: 1868-1034 (print) 
 
The online version of this article can be found at: 
<www.CurrentSoutheastAsianAffairs.org> 
 
 
 
Published by 
GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Institute of Asian Studies and 
Hamburg University Press. 
 
The Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs is an Open Access publication.  
It may be read, copied and distributed free of charge according to the conditions of the 
Creative Commons Attribution-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.   
 
To subscribe to the print edition: <ias@giga-hamburg.de> 
For an e-mail alert please register at: <www.CurrentSoutheastAsianAffairs.org> 
 
The Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs is part of the GIGA Journal Family, which 
also includes Africa Spectrum, Journal of Current Chinese Affairs and Journal of Politics 
in Latin America: <www.giga-journal-family.org>. 
 
  Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 2/2017: 71–100  
 
From Impediment to Adaptation:  
Chinese Investments in Myanmar’s New 
Regulatory Environment 
SiuSue Mark and Youyi Zhang 
Abstract: Myanmar’s political transition of 2011 was followed by chang-
es in the political and economic realms of society. The transition em-
boldened social activism, expressed as protests regarding the injustices 
suffered by people under the military regime. Many of these protests 
were related to large-scale extractive investments that had little regard for 
local communities and the environment. After the West lifted most of its 
sanctions, transnational capital actors who had been absent for the pre-
vious two decades returned to the country, many of them offering higher 
investment standards. In response to the “push” of public pressure and 
the “pull” of new investments, reformists in the Government of Myan-
mar (GoM) are now attempting to implement a stronger investment 
regulatory framework. The GoM’s new demands on foreign investments 
to comply with higher investment standards are strengthened by Chinese 
state reformers’ own nascent efforts to curtail the excesses of that coun-
try’s state-owned enterprises globally. As a result, prominent SOEs are 
being pressured to adapt to the new operating environment, resulting in 
observable changes in investment behaviour. We conclude that reform 
efforts are challenged by limitations on reformist state actors’ autonomy 
and capacity to regulate investments. 
  Manuscript received 18 May 2017; accepted 23 August 2017 
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Introduction 
Given Myanmar’s abundance of natural resources, its proximity to China 
and the lack of competition created by the imposition of sanctions by the 
West in 1990, Myanmar became one of China’s most strategic economic 
partners in the region once the latter launched its “Going Out” policy in 
2001. China’s dominance in Myanmar’s economy has risen significantly 
since the late 2000s. Using a number of official sources, Bissinger (2012) 
found that through the 1990s, actual investment in Myanmar from China 
amounted to a mere USD 8.5 million – only 0.23 per cent of all inflows – 
but rose to 60 per cent by the 2008–2009 fiscal year (FY).  
This has led to an increased focus on the nature of the Myanmar–
China economic (and political) relationship over the last decade. As early 
as 2006, Kudo (2006) was already warning that Chinese investments in 
Myanmar would have a negative impact on the latter’s longer-term eco-
nomic wellbeing. He said:  
China’s economic cooperation apparently supports the present re-
gime, but its effects on the whole economy will be limited with an 
unfavourable macroeconomic environment and distorted incen-
tives structure. As a conclusion, strengthened economic times 
with China will be instrumental in regime survival, but will not be 
a powerful force affecting the process of economic development 
in Myanmar. (Kudo 2006: 1) 
In Woods’ 2011 analysis of the Myanmar military’s state-building in the 
resource-rich ethnic ceasefire zones along the Yunnan, China border, he 
implicated largely informal Chinese investment flows in a violent process 
of land expropriation in the sectors of timber logging and rubber planta-
tions as part of China’s opium-substitution program (Woods 2011). His 
conclusions about Chinese investments were later echoed by Jones 
(2014), who included Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and pri-
vate investors as beneficiaries of Myanmar’s “state-mediated capitalism” 
under the military regime from 1988–2010. These works lead most to the 
conclusion that Chinese firms, mainly SOEs, benefited greatly from 
political ties between the two states prior to 2011 – often at the expense 
of local communities.  
Recently, a Transnational Institute (TNI) briefing paper on China’s 
engagement with Myanmar painted a much more nuanced picture. It 
argued that the evolving political context in Myanmar since its top-down 
military transition to a civilian government in 2011 challenged the way 
China had traditionally engaged with Myanmar, forcing the latter to 
question and change its strategy to one of diversified engagement with a 
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range of Myanmar interest groups beyond the government. This was 
largely driven by China’s prioritisation of stability in Myanmar and con-
cern with “the sustainability of the present system of governance and 
what this will mean for China,” especially its multiple investments in the 
country (TNI 2016: 1). The present paper builds on this line of argument 
and seeks to elaborate specifically on the way the Myanmar government, 
in its drive to build its international and domestic political legitimacy, has 
started to rationalise its approach to regulating investments, thereby 
mediating the behaviour of Chinese SOEs in Myanmar.  
Existing literature considers the processes of interaction between 
China and the West-dominated international order, as China has increas-
ingly joined multilateral international organisations and agreements at 
both regional and global levels (Economy and Oksenberg 1999; John-
ston 2008). For instance, Peterson (1999) examined China’s interactions 
with major multilateral economic institutions such as the WTO, IMF, 
and APEC, suggesting that these regional and international organisations 
have effectively engaged China. In the realm of foreign direct investment, 
Lin (2010) analysed the rise of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in 
China and the role of US and EU markets and civil society in promoting 
this concept among Chinese government and firms, especially SOEs. 
Despite the burgeoning literature on China’s adoption of international 
norms and standards, the literature has focused mostly on how Western 
states and multi-national corporations socialise Chinese state and com-
mercial actors into global economic governance, with a few other studies 
about China–ASEAN relations (Ba 2006). Overall, however, there is a 
lack of sufficient knowledge about the role of non-Western host coun-
tries in China’s adoption of international standards. Considering that a 
large portion of Chinese outbound investment flows into developing 
countries, we seek to address this gap in the literature by looking at how 
Chinese investors interact with Myanmar as a non-Western host state. In 
particular, as domestic political institutions mediate the socialisation 
process, we explore how Chinese investors adapt to the dynamic operat-
ing context of Myanmar.  
The transfer of power in Myanmar to a civilian government in 2011 
led to a visit by then-US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in November 
2011, the first in 56 years, followed by President Barack Obama’s visit 
the following year. After more than two decades of sanctions, most were 
gradually eased in May and September 2012, allowing the country to re-
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enter the global economy.1 This led to the return of international finan-
cial institutions (IFIs) and corporations, mostly Western ones, that had 
been absent in the sanctions period. Sensitive to the new post-sanctions 
environment, these investors are offering a relatively more attractive 
option to Myanmar than those negotiated under the military era.  
The transition was accompanied by an opening that allowed a wider 
range of social forces to engage with the state on a number of social and 
political issues. The new reforms emboldened the polity to claim the 
rights articulated by the highest levels of policymakers, including Presi-
dent Thein Sein, who publicly prioritised land restitution. On the ground, 
public protests for past and on-going land confiscations took central 
stage. Most of the protests were over land confiscations initiated in the 
military era (1988 to 2010), during which time the country was run by a 
military state with no constitution to check its power. It was during this 
period that many land-intensive investments were approved with few 
safeguards for communities and their environments, most notably by 
Chinese SOEs. Taken together, a central tension that the Myanmar state 
is grappling with is the balance between its need for internal and external 
legitimacy and the drive for more capital accumulation, as the country 
opens up to greater flows of capital. 
In this paper, we seek to explore this tension further. Evidence for 
the study is derived from a review of relevant academic literature and 
numerous interviews with Myanmar, Chinese and international inform-
ants over the last two years. In response to the “pull” of new invest-
ments and the “push” of public pressure, we argue that Myanmar’s re-
formist state forces have introduced a series of changes to the country’s 
regulatory environment that are pressuring Chinese SOEs to make in-
strumental improvements to the way they conduct business in the coun-
try. Pressure on SOEs to adapt to the new environment is strengthened 
by the Chinese government’s own attempts to curtail the global excesses 
of its state-owned enterprises. We conclude that the nascent changes 
have not been fully realised due to limitations on reformist state actors’ 
autonomy and capacity to more strongly regulate investments.  
  
                                                 
1  Sanctions were initiated after the SLORC (1988 to 1997) refused to transfer 
power to the National League for Democracy, which had defeated the military 
government in an open election. 
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Theorising the Modern Capitalist State 
Our conceptualisation of the modern capitalist state is informed by state-
theorist Nicos Poulantzas, who argued that the bureaucratic structures of 
the state come to reflect and become part of the class struggles that play 
out in society, making the state a site of contestation. As the case of 
Myanmar has demonstrated, this contestation is most intense in the early 
years of a regime transition, as various state and non-state actors vie for 
power. At such times, a critical issue with which the capitalist state often 
grapples is the dual and often conflicting roles of supporting capital 
accumulation among the dominant classes and ensuring political legiti-
macy among the dominated. While the state reflects and reproduces 
dominant ideology, it sometimes needs to rely on its “relative autonomy” 
(Poulantzas 1973: 143) in order to create an “unstable equilibrium of 
compromises” between the competing classes (Poulantzas 1978: 31); this 
might require the adoption of material measures that are in the interest 
of the masses.  
Compromises were necessary when the state started to lose political 
legitimacy in both the domestic and global spheres; the former was evi-
denced by the 2007 “Saffron Revolution” led by monks, and the latter 
was evidenced by sanctions from the West. Compromises were also 
needed when the very functioning of the capitalist system was in jeop-
ardy, as was the case in Myanmar pre-transition, when the country was 
economically failing under sanctions from the West and was overly de-
pendent on China. These failures were exhibited through low levels of 
employment, economic growth, and industrialisation. Faced with both 
political and economic crisis, the state in pre-transition Myanmar was 
forced to make a series of reforms, including taking measures to rein in 
capital through stronger regulation (Gamble 2006). 
As the Myanmar government was trying to diversify its economic 
growth from the monopolies dominated by the Chinese, military enter-
prises and favoured “crony” companies, by promoting more competition, 
the post-transition period saw the return of transnational capitalist actors, 
which had mostly been absent in the last two decades under the sanc-
tions policy. In this paper, transnational capitalist actors refer to both 
transnational corporations (TNCs) and IFIs. While IFIs have mandates 
beyond just profit-making, such as the World Bank’s stated mission to 
alleviate poverty, many IFIs and TNCs share and promote similar in-
vestment norms, including clear and consistent investment regulations, 
strong private property laws, and in many cases a policy of corporate 
social responsibility.  
  From Impediment to Adaptation 77
 

 
Although transnational capitalist actors that abide by higher corpo-
rate standards still comprise a small share of the total foreign direct in-
vestment, we seek to demonstrate that their impact is significant, simply 
because of timing. More state reformers appeared after the 2010 national 
elections, which resulted in the election of opposition party members 
and the development of a more independent parliament. Wanting to 
overcome the political and economic crisis left by the old regime, these 
state reformers became more open to accepting these new investment 
norms. Thus, as Bieler and Morton observed, “The phenomenon now 
referred to as globalization therefore represents the transnational organi-
zation of production relations which are internalized within states” 
(2013: 42).  
Scholars in the business strategy literature (Tsebelis 2002; Henisz 
and Zelner 2006) have shown that the number of actors in a polity with 
the ability to influence political decisions (“veto players”) has an impact 
on the degree of influence that foreign investors, as well as other interest 
groups, have on policy making (Jensen et al. 2012). The above-men-
tioned scholars argued that the more pluralistic a governing authority, as 
demonstrated by checks and balances and presence of  opposition parties, 
and the wider the distribution of  veto authority, the greater the effort and 
resources that TNCs must expend to convince policy makers to assure 
sustainable investment projects, and the more diluted the influence of  
foreign investors over host states. This is because foreign investors must 
present their arguments against competing positions. In a departure from 
the free reign given to Chinese investments under the military regime, 
state reformers under the Thein Sein government started to call for 
stronger corporate governance, making modest gains. Given the greater 
strength of the democratic opposition in the current NLD (National 
League for Democracy) government, and the creation of new regulatory 
units such as the Environmental Conservation Department, the Gov-
ernment of Myanmar (GoM) may be able to further advance this agenda 
of corporate governance. In recent years, these developments have 
forced high-profile Chinese SOEs operating in Myanmar to adapt to an 
evolving operating context, which we demonstrate in the empirical sec-
tions that follow. 
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Myanmar–China Economic Relationship in  
Recent Decades 
China’s relationship2 with Burma/Myanmar has always been highly in-
volved, but not always been smooth, vacillating between hostility and 
interdependence (see Taylor 2009). Under U Nu’s presidency (1948–
1962), the relationship was troubled by border disputes, including the 
People’s Liberation Army’s incursion into the northern Shan State in 
1952 to cut off Kuomintang (Guomindang) forces, and later by the 
Communist Party of China’s (CPC) support for the Communist Party of 
Burma (CPB) and other politically aligned insurgent groups in the north. 
Since 1988, following the collapse of both General Ne Win’s “Burmese 
Way to Socialism” and CPB’s armed opposition against the military re-
gime, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), which 
became the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) in 1997, 
consolidated power. Following this, China started to develop close polit-
ical and strategic ties with the SLORC–SPDC regime, assuming that the 
Burmese armed forces, the tatmadaw, would remain in power. This was 
promoted by ceasefires in the mid-1990s. As a result, China became the 
most important ally to the SLORC–SPDC regime in the past two dec-
ades.  
Beijing-based Chinese government officials and researchers 
acknowledged that the central government in Myanmar has mainly fo-
cused on stability: a secure environment for energy and resources needs, 
as well as secure borders.3 Agencies such as the Ministry of Commerce 
(MOFCOM) took the lead in policy-making towards Myanmar at the 
central government level. Another prime concern of the Chinese central 
government regarding Myanmar was related to the so-called “Malacca 
Dilemma.” By transporting oil and gas overland through Myanmar, Chi-
na would avoid passing through the waters of the Malacca Straits, which 
are dominated by the United States and its Asian allies (TNI 2016).  
The economic security strategy adopted at the central government 
level is partly informed by the Yunnan provincial government’s need for 
economic growth. Trade between Yunnan and Myanmar in 2014 ac-
                                                 
2  Chinese investment in Myanmar has occurred in both the informal and the 
formal sectors. The informal investments have been documented by TNI pa-
pers, which show that these investments have been concentrated in the ethnic 
borderlands. These values might be even larger due to an intensification of anti-
corruption campaigns in China (see Larkin 2014). The present paper does not 
look at informal investments as these are nearly impossible to regulate.  
3  Interview with government think tank researchers, Beijing, 11 October 2016.  
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counted for 49 per cent of the former’s trade with ASEAN, and almost 
30 per cent of all trade between China and Myanmar (Hong Kong Trade 
Development Council 2016). For instance, the Myanmar–China oil and 
gas pipeline, one of the largest recent infrastructural investments in My-
anmar, was originally proposed by academics at Yunnan University and 
Yunnan Academy of Social Science. The then-Party Secretaries of Yun-
nan Province, Bai Enpei, and of Kunming City, Qiu He, strongly sup-
ported the proposal as they planned to build an oil refinery in Kunming 
as a supplemental project to the pipeline (Reuters 2008). Upon receiving 
this proposal, Beijing appointed the China National Petroleum Corpora-
tion (CNPC) to implement the Shwe pipeline project, aiming to achieve 
both national energy security and local economic growth.4 
The Sino–Myanmar economic relationship was also shaped by the 
growing autonomy of Chinese SOEs after decades of decentralisation 
and the fragmentation of the Chinese one-party state system, which 
weakened regulatory oversight even as competition between the SOEs 
increased in a race to invest around the world, Myanmar included. Both 
central and provincial governments relied on SOEs to realise their 
growth goals. Prior to 2011, Premier Wen Jiabao and Vice President Xi 
Jinping visited Myanmar to offer their support to SOE mega projects. 
Chinese policy banks were also key players. For instance, the China Exim 
Bank funded infrastructure projects like the Yeywa dam (China Exim 
Bank 2008) and airport projects in Yangon (MOFCOM 2017) and 
Naypyidaw (ifeng.com 2010).  
Statistics from the Directorate for Investments and Companies 
Administration (DICA) show that from 1988 to 2016, a total of USD 
18.52 billion in Chinese FDI was approved by Myanmar (DICA 2016). 
Bissinger (2012) showed that Chinese investments only started to grow 
in 2008. These included the USD 997 million Letpadaung copper mine 
and the USD 856 million Tagaungtaung Nickel Mine, as well as the mul-
ti-billion USD Shwe Pipeline and a number of large dams in Kachin, 
Shan, and Karen States. Partly as a result of financial losses from suspen-
sion of Myitsone Dam, which affected confidence in the investment 
climate, Chinese investments dropped significantly in 2012 and 2013, but 
picked up again in 2013 for a total approved investment of USD 4.5 
billion from 2012 to 2016. However, investments from Singapore in that 
period surpassed those of China, with USD 13.9 billion. Nevertheless, 
China remains the largest approved total investor, with more than USD 
                                                 
4  Interview with a researcher involved in CNPC overseas programs, Beijing, 20 
July 2016. 
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18.5 billion, followed by Singapore with USD 15.5 billion and Thailand 
with USD 10.5 billion, according to DICA’s figures in November 2016.5 
While nearly all of the Chinese investments were in the power sec-
tor, with much smaller investments in the oil and gas sectors, recent 
years have seen some diversification to infrastructure including roads, 
railways, ports and economic zones. Nearly all sources of these invest-
ments are from SOEs. Extractive sectors made up 68 per cent of all of 
Myanmar’s actual investments between FY1988 and FY2011 (Bissinger 
2012).  
Myanmar Government Tightens Investment 
Regulations Post-2011  
In recent years, the GoM has been increasingly strengthening its invest-
ment regulatory framework, first under President Thein Sein and then 
through the NLD government. This was catalysed by the public backlash 
against high-profile Chinese investments. The GoM’s reformist efforts 
have also been facilitated by the return of transnational capitalist actors 
and, with them, improved international standards. The rationalisation of 
Myanmar’s investments is having a direct impact on Chinese SOEs oper-
ating in Myanmar and, although it is still in the early phases and instru-
mental in nature, has led to observable modifications in their investment 
behaviours. 
Political Backlash against Chinese Investments 
The protest politics that accompanied the suspension of the Myitsone 
Dam made it clear that Myanmar civil society became a force to be reck-
oned with since the start of the Thein Sein government. On 30 Septem-
ber 2011, only six months after Thein Sein took office, and to the sur-
prise of civil society and the Chinese government, he suspended the 
Myitsone Dam in Kachin State. This dam is a joint venture between the 
China Power Investment Corporation (CPI) (recently changed to State 
Power Investment, SPI), the GoM’s Ministry of Electric Power, and the 
                                                 
5  There are a few limitations to this data: (1) Chinese companies often invest 
through third countries like Hong Kong; (2) Chinese companies often structure 
informal deals with Burmese and register as local companies; and (3) the sus-
pended Myitsone dam project is still included, which inflates the investment 
amount.  
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Asia World Company.6 This decision was historical in terms of Myan-
mar’s history given the scale of the advocacy efforts, which mobilised a 
wide range of civil society actors that were also effective in influencing 
key decision-makers in the government.  
There continues to be speculation about the reasons why the presi-
dent made this decision, but analysts have offered several explanations: 
(a) He had already decided earlier to cancel the project, but needed the 
political justification of a public outcry against it; (b) this would be a clear 
win for him in terms of gaining popularity soon after coming into office, 
both in the eyes of the Myanmar people and to the Western audience; (c) 
having been ostracised by the West for two decades, a move to demon-
strate Myanmar’s autonomy from China would strengthen the rap-
prochement with the West; and (d) Thein Sein wanted to reduce the 
tension in Kachin state, given the conflict between the military and the 
KIO, which resumed right before the dam’s cancellation (Kempel 2012). 
The Myitsone dam decision set the tone for the handling of the in-
famous Letpadaung Copper Mine in late 2012. The Letpadaung Copper 
Mine in Monywa District, Sagaing Division involved 7868 acres of con-
fiscated farmland and affected 26 villages. In June 2010, rights to this 
project were acquired by Norinco (Wanbao’s mother company), the 
China North Industries Cooperation, and the Union of Myanmar Eco-
nomic Holding Limited, a military conglomerate (Kyu Kyu 2014). With 
the involvement of police and local authorities, the forced relocation of 
communities started in late 2010. The mine attracted a great deal of at-
tention from domestic and international media for state forces’ violent 
crackdown on demonstrators, including monks who were protesting the 
demolition of a revered Buddhist temple on the mine site. For a nomi-
nally democratic government that wanted to distance itself from its au-
thoritarian past, the GoM was forced to take action.  
A government commission headed by Aung San Suu Kyi, then a re-
cently elected parliamentarian, was fielded to investigate this case and to 
determine whether and how the project should continue. The commis-
sion eventually determined that the project should continue, as long as 
the revenue shares were renegotiated and communities compensated. 
                                                 
6  Asia World Co. Ltd was founded in 1992 by a Kokang Lo Hsing Han, who was 
known to have amassed wealth through the drug trade, which he passed onto 
his son, Steven Law. Due to connections to his Singaporean wife, an estimated 
50 per cent of Singapore’s investments was exchanged between the two coun-
tries through Asia World. Steven Law and his wife were on the American sanc-
tions list for their suspected connections to the drug trade (Irrawaddy 2000). 
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Regarding the handling of this case, the Chinese ambassador to Myan-
mar, Li Junhua, said at a press conference in December 2012: 
We will accept [its recommendations] if they have good advice to 
create stronger mutual cooperation between Myanmar and China 
[…] Our embassy and company are ready to cooperate with the 
commission so that the correct result comes out […]. (Myanmar 
Times 2012) 
These two “wins” were credited to strong public opposition, and further 
emboldened Myanmar’s civil society groups. The outcomes of these two 
projects signalled to the public that the domestic political space had 
changed and now allowed for critique of Chinese (and other) invest-
ments that were deemed to be damaging to local communities. It is high-
ly likely that this public outcry was privately acquiesced to by govern-
ment reformers who wanted to see many of the earlier deals with the 
Chinese government renegotiated. This wave of public criticism of Chi-
nese investments continued with the 2015 release of a Global Witness 
report on Myanmar’s largely illicit jade trade. This study implicated China 
as the main destination for a trade estimated to be worth USD 31 billion. 
Global Witness called this “the biggest natural resource heist in modern 
history” (Global Witness 2015). 
Impact of Transnational Capital Norms on Myanmar’s 
Regulatory Framework 
Together with the “push” of social activism, the Myanmar government’s 
attempts to rationalise foreign investments have also been influenced by 
the “pull” of relatively more attractive social and environmental terms 
offered by many returning transnational capitalist actors. This has coin-
cided with the government reformers’ interest in diversifying the national 
economy dominated by military, favoured companies, and a handful of 
investor countries considered to not have offered Myanmar fair terms, 
and to create a more equal playing field. The deputy director general of 
the Forest Department,7 a department which has witnessed the extensive 
destruction of extractive projects, made the following statement: 
We need more international investors. They should compete to 
invest here, and the best should come here. We don’t need to rely 
on the Chinese only […] This means ease of doing business for 
                                                 
7  Interview with Deputy Director General of the Forest Department, Naypidaw, 
22 December 2016. 
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everyone, not just cronies and Chinese, but domestic businesses 
and all other investors. 
A more diverse group of transnational capitalist actors has been entering 
Myanmar since most sanctions were lifted in 2012. These include trans-
national corporations and all the major IFIs, such as the World Bank, the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC), and the Asian Development 
Bank (ADB). While still a small share of the total, approved investments 
as of November 2016 show increases in investments from a more diver-
sified group of OECD countries that had previously adhered fully or 
partially to the sanctions policy. Official data demonstrate accelerated 
growth. While average annual investment from OECD countries was 
USD 1.7 billion over the 22 years from 1988 to 2011, it rose to USD 5.3 
billion over the four financial years from 2012 to 2016 (DICA 2016).  
In contrast to the older way of doing business, many of these inves-
tors are seeking to bring in higher social and environmental standards. 
Clearer land ownership and related issues of conflict arbitration and 
compensation guidance are issues around which businesses can increas-
ingly be mobilised. These new dynamics were apparent at a seminar 
about land-based investments held at Myanmar’s Chamber of Commerce 
on 2 July 2015. An IFC advisor to the Myanmar Business Forum (a net-
work of foreign and domestic firms coordinating to address obstacles in 
Myanmar’s investment context) presented the issues faced by companies 
seeking to source land for investments, including high transaction costs. 
The advisor said:  
It is in businesses interest that government grants secure and clear 
land rights to people. The business would not have to do the run 
around trying to figure out who owns what. If land ownership is 
clear, you just have to pay for the land.8  
New investment standards brought in by returning corporations demon-
strate an understanding that negative impacts to reputation pose risks to 
their businesses’ reputation and bottom line. Foreign companies, pri-
marily Western ones, concerned with consumer image are starting to 
either set up their own companies or to set up supplier companies. Ap-
parel manufacturers are training their suppliers in labour, health and 
                                                 
8  Statement made by the Myanmar Business Forum, Yangon, 2 July 2015. The 
views expressed by the firm have often been criticized by those opposing a le-
gally backed private property model as facilitating the concentration of land in-
to the hands of those who can pay the highest price for it. In the best-case sce-
narios, these transactions are made with willing buyers and willing sellers, but 
the seller often sells at sub-optimal conditions of financial duress. 
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safety, and land acquisition standards. In preparing to set up factories in 
Myanmar, one Western apparel company expressed concerns for poten-
tial land conflicts that might arise in the process of securing land for 
these factories. Precautions could involve hiring lawyers to document the 
paper trail for land ownership of a particular plot and consulting with 
communities prior to leasing. The company’s corporate responsibility 
manager said, “We got burned by the media for sourcing cotton. We take 
the land issue seriously.”9  
A foreign telecommunications company expressed a similar senti-
ment:  
We have many American shareholders and are sensitive to the 
SDN list. We currently have 1200 towers, and only about 100 are 
leased from government; the rest are privately owned since it is 
simpler. We get our subcontractors to double check, as well as our 
in-house counsel. We must be 100 per cent clear about an owner’s 
claim to the land and they must have paperwork under the exist-
ing laws […]. If not clear, we don’t lease it.10  
The Myanmar Centre for Responsible Business (MCRB), a non-profit 
headed by a former British diplomat, has also been working to raise the 
awareness of international best practices among businesses by facilitating 
discussions that bring together government, the private sector, and civil 
society to discuss the need for improving regulations in the extractive 
industry. These discussions aim to bring international standards into the 
domestic discourse. For example, in a workshop on the extractive indus-
try in January 2015, the French oil and gas company Total shared guid-
ance on the implementation of Free Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) 
principles and complaint mechanisms. These venues provided an oppor-
tunity for civil society groups to constructively discuss their concerns 
with government and private sector – something that was rarely done in 
the past.11  
These new approaches to investment could also be seen among 
state reformers. Regarding the Letpadaung Copper Mine, the director 
general for DICA said:  
                                                 
9  Interview with an appeal company, Yangon, 25 May 2015. 
10  Interview with MCRB, Yangon, 11 September 2015. 
11  Despite these examples, not all new investors will be concerned with stronger 
corporate governance. A review conducted by the Business and Human Rights 
Resource Centre in 2015 found that many extractive companies and hotels do 
not even have land acquisition policies.  
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The copper mine was approved 30 to 40 years ago by the old re-
gime. We cannot take back what we had granted in the past. Our 
role is to prevent those kinds of problems from happening again. 
Now we make sure of things before we go ahead. The Thilawa 
SEZ is a model for the government to replicate. The central 
committee for the national land use management is trying to take 
those standards and scale them up.12  
Changing motivations among Myanmar government reforms have been 
accompanied by the passage of several important laws to strengthen the 
social and environmental safeguards on investments. Prominent among 
them was the 2012 Environmental Protection Law, with by-laws issued 
in July 2014. A director at the Environmental Conservation Department 
(ECD) said international technical advisors have supported them in the 
drafting of a number of regulatory instruments; these include the ADB 
for environmental impact assessment procedures, Japan’s International 
Corporation Agency (JICA) for environmental management plans, and 
the IFC for environmental emissions standards and strategic environ-
mental assessment procedures for the hydropower sector. The director 
of the policy unit said, “We can learn many things from international 
experiences and take the most appropriate for Myanmar. Traditional 
knowledge can’t be used for new issues.”13  
International best practice was also considered useful for the draft-
ing of the National Land Use Policy (NLUP), which was adopted by the 
Myanmar cabinet in January 2016 and was considered by many to be a 
much more progressive policy than what existed before. The deputy 
director general of the Forest Department, which served as the secretari-
at to the drafting process, said, “There is no policy like this compared to 
all others. It is in line with Myanmar standards.”14 Concerning the role of 
international standards in the drafting process, he said:  
We not only need international standards, but also our own. Not 
all international standards are in line with Myanmar’s situation. 
But we need capacity building because our government closed the 
door for 50 years. After that, we decide our way. 
While the Myanmar state is still challenged by numerous capacity gaps to 
enforce its regulations, it does not mean that foreign companies are im-
mune to these changing regulatory frameworks. In response to these new 
                                                 
12  Interview with the Directory General for DICA, Yangon, 2 December 2014. 
13  Interview with ECD, Nay Pyi Taw, 22 December 2016. 
14  Interview with the deputy director general of the Forest Department, Naypi-
daw, 22 December 2016. 
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international standards, Chinese companies operating in Myanmar said 
that they are causing pragmatic impediments and operational delays. One 
SOE manager in the power sector complained that:  
The approval process of Myanmar government is much less effi-
cient now than before the power transition. Now every detail of 
even some smaller projects needs to be reported to the top level, 
which prolongs the approval process.15 
Response of Chinese Government and  
Adaptation by SOEs 
After decades of enjoying market dominance in Myanmar, the Chinese 
government is now dealing with criticism from multiple interest groups, 
more diversified competition, and a rising bar on investments being 
imposed by the host government. This is not unique to Myanmar, as 
Chinese investments around the world have presented not only financial 
but also political challenges to Beijing. As a result, the Chinese govern-
ment has been shifting its stance towards regulation of its SOE invest-
ments in Myanmar and globally.  
Beijing’s Evolving Stance towards Outbound  
Investments  
In recent years, China has emerged as one of the largest sources of out-
ward FDI to the developing world. This trend will inevitably grow 
stronger as China enters a new stage in its international economic state-
craft through the launch of its “One Belt One Road” (OBOR) initiative, 
to which the country initially pledged USD 124 billion in a May 2017 
summit (South Asian Monitor 2017). Started in 2013 by President Xi 
Jinping, this development strategy seeks to strengthen connectivity be-
tween China, Asia, Europe, Africa and beyond, based on construction of 
infrastructure along a road “belt” and a maritime “road,” while serving to 
stimulate trade through harmonised regulations and reduced protection-
ism. This is complemented by the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 
(AIIB), a new multilateral lending institution initiated by China with 37 
member states and USD 100 billion in capital as of late 2016.  
                                                 
15  Interview with a manager from a Chinese central SOE, Yangon, 22 December 
2016. 
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A distinct feature of China’s “Going Out” strategy since early 2000s 
has been that most of the Chinese TNCs that operate overseas are SOEs. 
While traditional TNCs based in developed countries tend to act as au-
tonomous economic entities, the state-owned TNCs also act as agents of 
their principal, the central government, in international expansion. For 
instance, some Chinese state-owned TNCs in the infrastructure and 
mining sectors have allegedly targeted markets in Africa as a means of 
improving political relationships between China and host governments 
(Gill and Reilly 2007; Alden and Large 2011).  
It is commonly believed that the Chinese government imposes low-
er environmental standards on its overseas investments than many West-
ern companies and multilateral investment institutions (Munson and 
Zheng 2012; Mol 2011). On the other hand, China’s policy towards its 
overseas investments appears to have changed over the last decade, in 
response to a host of growing investment-related disputes between Chi-
na and host countries, and the fact that Chinese state capital is closely 
coupled with the central government’s political objectives. Various levels 
of  Chinese state actors are demanding that SOEs, particularly those 
owned by the central government, follow local laws and regulations in 
host states, so as to ensure the effectiveness of  Chinese economic state-
craft (Sauvant and Chen 2014). 
In November 2013 at the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of China, party leaders discussed the 
need for companies to actively adopt social and environmental standards 
(Third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee 2013). By 
2013, the Chinese Government had issued 31 regulations and guidelines 
pertaining to Chinese ODI (UNDP 2015). These regulations and guide-
lines mostly focused on company operations and Chinese worker safety, 
and rarely touched upon the respect for human rights in host countries. 
For example, in 2013, the Guidelines for Environmental Protection in Foreign 
Investment and Cooperation was issued by China’s MOFCOM and the Min-
istry of Environmental Protection. These guidelines recommend that 
Chinese corporations should: 
[…] respect the religious belief, cultural traditions and national 
customs of community residents of the host country, safeguard 
legitimate [labour] rights and interests […] promote harmonious 
development of local economy, environment and community, and 
carry out cooperation on the basis of mutual benefits. (MOFCOM 
2013) 
An advisor to Global Witness said that Chinese companies, including 
state-owned enterprises, have been expanding their investments overseas 
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in the last decade and increasingly coming under pressure from various 
critics for not managing their relations with local communities effectively. 
Even though companies were of the opinion that they had already ful-
filled their responsibility by following whatever standards were set by 
host governments (often minimal), they have not been able to stem ris-
ing public outcries. There are multiple, often contradictory, interests 
regarding how Chinese overseas investments should look – those of 
MOFCOM, state-backed insurance companies, banks, and the diplomat-
ic service – which often face criticism in host countries. As a result, 
MOFCOM, which selects economic counsellors for overseas consulates, 
may deny its consent for a loan from China’s Exim Bank if a company 
does not conduct an EIA acceptable to a host government.16 “Just be-
cause they are voluntary does not mean that they are worthless. These 
guidelines must be echoed by domestic legislation,” the Global Witness 
advisor concluded.17  
One example from Africa demonstrates how these new dynamics 
are playing out. The China Exim Bank offered a multi-billion loan to 
finance the Standard Gauge Railway, as part of the East Africa Commu-
nity Railway Masterplan. China’s investment in the East African rail 
project is also designed, in part, to counter the perception that China is 
only interested in extracting African resources.18 In May 2014, during his 
visit to Kenya, Premier Li Keqiang witnessed the signing of a USD 3.8 
billion contract for the railway between China Roads and Bridges Corpo-
ration (CRBC) and the Kenyan government, attaching political and stra-
tegic significance to the project. To ensure the smooth progress of the 
project, CRBC made efforts to appease local workers. According to a 
manager of CRBC on the construction site, “Our biggest headache is 
local workers’ strike!” While he was confused why local workers strike, 
he worked to negotiate with local workers and insisted that they abide by 
Kenyan law and their contract, so as to prevent strikes from happening 
in the first place.19 
Globally, there appears to be a change in the way Chinese enterpris-
es work overseas. But the real test will be in the way China implements 
                                                 
16  Interview with CAITEC researchers, Beijing, 18 September 2016; also refer to 
MOFCOM 2014. For more information: <http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/artic 
le/zt_cv/lanmucc/201409/20140900731570.shtml> (5 September 2017). 
17  Interview with an adviser to Global Witness, Yangon, 27 August 2015. 
18  Interview with Economic and Commercial Counsellor’s Office, Nairobi, 10 
August 2015. 
19  Interview with representatives from a CRBC subsidiary, Nairobi, 10 August 
2015. 
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projects through OBOR and the AIIB. Observers have so far noted that 
consultations on creating an environmental and social framework for the 
AIIB are inadequate.20 
China in Myanmar 
Prior to the transition in 2011, most Chinese investors were of the mind-
set that “they only have to meet local laws; if there are no local laws then 
they have met the requirements.”21 The head of public relations for a 
developer of the Myitsone Dam said:  
In the old Myanmar, the old government era, you couldn’t talk 
freely, and everything was done on a government-to-government 
basis. You couldn’t check with families about their wishes or 
whether they were willing to relocate. (Myanmar Times 2016a)  
After the Myitsone Dam decision and the resistance encountered in 
other projects, Myanmar–China scholars have opined that the country’s 
transition has changed Sino–Myanmar relations in a way that Myanmar 
sees China as less important than before and that China has less control 
over the direction of this relationship (for example, see, Li 2014). This 
kind of thinking led the Chinese government to resort to new ways of 
engaging with Myanmar and to seek ways to reign in its SOEs in the 
years following the transition. As evidence of this changing approach to 
Myanmar, the Chinese state-controlled China Daily ran a six-page special 
on Myanmar in early April 2016. Its front-page headline declared, “Lend-
ing a hand: Chinese firms realise the value of helping local communities 
as they focus on building a long-term presence in Myanmar.” The mes-
saging from Beijing started to trickle down to its SOEs. The day after the 
NLD government came to power in April 2016, Wanbao released a 10-
minute public relations video entitled “A New Dawn” explaining why 
the Letpadaung Mine project was suspended in 2012 and highlighting the 
need for social acceptance. In the video, Wanbao’s Deputy General 
Manager Luo Daqing said: 
                                                 
20  Please see: <https://business-humanrights.org/en/asian-infrastructure-invest 
ment-bank-aiib-holds-consultations-on-its-environmental-social-framework-
ngos-say-process-is-grossly-inadequate> (5 September 2017). 
21  Statement by legal advisor to the Myitsone dam at CGIAR Mekong Conference, 
Phnom Penh, 23 October 2015. The word ‘requirements’ means what the in-
vestor companies believe to be their corporate responsibilities. 
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If we do not take social risk into account, if we don’t serve the lo-
cal community well, and ensure stability, then without the support 
of local people, no matter how much money we have, or how 
good our technology is, the project will not succeed. (Myanmar 
Times 2016a)  
Despite the negative image of this mine, it is one of the few mining 
companies in Myanmar to have undertaken and disclosed a comprehen-
sive Environmental and Social Impact Assessment, which has been made 
public on Wanbao’s website. According to the recommendations of the 
Commission, their revised compensation package includes USD 2 mil-
lion annually to cover environmental costs during the production phase; 
2 per cent of net profits toward corporate social responsibility initiatives 
for the communities (Irrawaddy 2016b); one or two jobs per household, 
or a monthly subsidy in lieu of work (Myanmar Times 2016b); and paying 
more for lost farmland and crops. While there is room for improvement, 
a representative of the Myanmar Centre for Responsible Business com-
mented that the Letpadaung Mine is one of the better managed mines in 
Myanmar.22  
Still, the project continues to face challenges to its efforts to quell 
the continuing protests. One reason is the project’s inability to detach 
itself from state security forces, which shot a local community member 
in 2015. Civil society groups say that while the company had generally 
adhered to the Commission’s recommendations, which are not specific 
and lack strong enforcement, its efforts have fallen short. According to a 
researcher involved with a study for the Myanmar Alliance for Transpar-
ency and Accountability (MATA), this has resulted in villagers being 
worse off than before in terms of income and food security.23  
In another case, the SOE Power China, a member of the Interna-
tional Hydropower Association, indicated that it is aware of the unequal 
distribution of electricity between China and Myanmar and has stated its 
willingness to renegotiate bi-lateral agreements. In 2014, the vice presi-
dent of Power China said, “if the new government thinks there is more 
power demands now in Myanmar, then of course there is no problem to 
meet the local demand first” (Irrawaddy 2014). Similarly, the China Non-
Ferrous Metals Company (CNMC), a member of Myanmar’s Extractive 
Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI), recently indicated that the com-
pany took lessons from the Letpadaung case when designing its own 
                                                 
22  Interview with MCRB director, Yangon, 27 December 2015. 
23  Interview with MATA researcher, 5 February 2016. 
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CSR policies.24 In yet another example, CNPC in June 2017 released an 
updated corporate social responsibility report about its oil and gas pipe-
lines. According to the report, from the start of the project to late March 
2017, CNPC and its partners invested more than USD 23 million in 178 
social and economic assistance projects, covering education, infrastruc-
ture, health care, and communication along the pipeline routes.25 By the 
end of 2016, local employees accounted for 72 per cent of the pipeline 
project staff. Highly-skilled Myanmar employees were assigned to im-
portant technical positions, and a total of 226 local companies participat-
ed in the project’s construction (The Independent 2017).  
Case Study of CITIC in the Kyaukphyu SEZ  
As the Kyaukphyu SEZ project managed by the China International 
Trust and Investment Corporation (CITIC) is still in the early stages of 
development in Myanmar, a study of this case is used to further demon-
strate the changes Chinese SOEs are undertaking.  
The Kyaukphyu SEZ and deep seaport are central to achieving 
China’s OBOR vision. In the last few years, for reasons including high 
insecurity in the region, the Myitsone precedent, ongoing protests, and a 
more critical regional government, the NLD government has been delay-
ing project implementation. According to an interview with a CITIC 
representative, the project has been heavily delayed since discussions 
started in 2009.26  
CITIC managers believe that most CSOs and communities do not 
strongly oppose the project, and charged that some CSOs were set up to 
oppose and disrupt the investment project. They met with monks and 
local representatives to try to win their support, arguing that the SEZ 
project will bring more opportunities for local economic and social de-
velopment.27 
Myanmar policymakers and civil society groups have expressed 
mixed feelings towards the SEZ and seaport. Several central committee 
members of the dominant Arakan National Party welcomed the SEZ 
project with the expectation that it will bring more benefits in terms of 
jobs, education, and local development to the local community. 28  In 
                                                 
24  Interview with CNMC staff, Yangon, 15 December 2016. 
25  For more details, please see the full company report, online: <http://csr.cnpc. 
com.cn/csr/xhtml/PageAssets/mdbg2016-en.pdf>. 
26  Interview with CITIC staff, Kyaukphyu, 10 June 2016. 
27  Interview with CITIC staff, Kyaukphyu, 10 June 2016. 
28  Interview with central committee members of ANP, Sittwe, 18 June 2016. 
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addition, members of the monk association in Kyaukphyu Township 
expressed a degree of support for the SEZ project, but want to see better 
treatment and more benefits for local villagers.29 
Other Myanmar stakeholders treat this investment with great wari-
ness. A Rakhine Member of Parliament who was invited by SESAC to 
Beijing in 2016 to discuss Chinese investments expressed his dissatisfac-
tion with the project. He said:  
I haven’t seen any better practices as regards to foreign invest-
ments. They could say that there are community investments in-
corporated into their operations, but we really feel that they are 
fake.30  
In early 2017, about 300 people from 25 villages in Kyaukphyu Town-
ship called for a suspension of the SEZ until the government could un-
veil a compensation scheme for land acquisition, a resettlement plan and 
SEZ by-laws (Irrawaddy 2017). 
Given the conflicting opinions among policymakers and civil socie-
ty, and delays from the central government, CITIC and the Chinese 
government are now looking for ways to engage with diverse stakehold-
ers, including MCRB and Oxfam in Yangon.31  CITIC also benefited 
from its consortium partner, a Thai company. Based on the partner’s 
previous experience, CITIC implemented a USD 1.5 million micro-
finance scheme. The manager acknowledged that: 
We should learn from international experiences regarding social li-
cense and social recognition both elsewhere and in Myanmar. For 
instance, Japan released more shares to local communities in their 
Thilawa SEZ project, which set a good example for our SEZ.32  
In early November 2016, a meeting organised under the UNDP brought 
together Chinese authorities, CITIC, Burmese civil society and govern-
ment authorities. A meeting organiser said:  
Five years ago, that kind of meeting was impossible […] Their 
vice president participated. His attitude was open, friendly and re-
spectful, indicating a willingness to work with NGOs. He said 
                                                 
29  Interview with CSOs, Kyaukphyu, 12 June 2016. 
30  Phone interview with Rakhine State MP, 15 December 2016. 
31  Interview with CSOs, Kyaukphyu, 12 June 2016. 
32  Interview with CITIC staff, Kyaukphyu, 10 June 2016. 
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they want to do the best EIA and SIA. Myanmar is very attractive 
to them. They said the transition period gave them challenges.33 
This section demonstrates the impact that Myanmar’s evolving regulato-
ry framework has had on Chinese SOEs operating here, although these 
dynamics are subject to continual contestation and require stronger over-
sight. Burmese private sector representatives such as U Maung Maung 
Lay, vice chair of UMFCCI, Myanmar’s chamber of commerce, said 
“Being a huge country, the Chinese government cannot control them. 
China itself is suffering in many areas due to this and tarnishing its image 
worldwide.” On the other hand, he believes that progress is possible if 
companies become more ethical in their operations (Myanmar Times 
2016a). While it is likely that China will only become ethical in response 
to pressures placed on it by the host government and local communities, 
rather than on its own accord, only time will tell whether these initial 
changes will result in lasting improvements in the lives of Myanmar peo-
ple. Nevertheless, we believe they still represent a step in the right direc-
tion. In the final analysis, as noted by one of Myitsone’s legal advisors, 
“Myanmar needs to define a clear vision and a transparent legal frame-
work that investors can trust.”34 
Limitations on the Burmese Government to 
Regulate 
The degree to which the state will be able to advance higher investment 
standards is as much dependent on its capacity to carry out complex 
administration of such reforms as it is on the reformers’ ability to main-
tain their autonomy in the face of resistance to reform.  
The GoM’s low capacity is reflected in its application of its own le-
gal framework. For example, even though the land laws include clauses 
that call for fair market compensation when land is appropriated by the 
government for development projects, the detailed regulations are often 
ambiguous and their implementation not standardised. This is further 
hampered by overlapping authorities, a fragmented and “stacked” legal 
framework (Mark 2016), a lack of a proper registration of land owner-
ship, and conflicting maps held by line ministries.  
                                                 
33  Interview with NGO, Beijing, 25 November 2016. 
34  Statement by legal advisor to the Myitsone Dam at CGIAR Conference, 
Phnom Penh, 23 October 2015. 
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As a result of the ambiguities, even the Thilawa SEZ – which the 
government considers to be an example of a well-managed land acquisi-
tion – continues to face challenges and delays. In this case, the develop-
ers were unable to verify multiple claims on land, to manage uncon-
trolled speculation that brought many new false claimants, and a legal 
framework that does not provide clear guidance on what is considered 
“sufficient” compensation. The Thilawa Commission compiled a com-
pensation package based on the 2012 Farmland Law and the World 
Bank’s displacement standards, which was criticised as inadequate due to 
claims that it left the former tenants worse off after they were moved.  
While a project like Thilawa has received a lot of public scrutiny, 
capital that goes through informal channels is particularly difficult for the 
state to regulate. A political economy analysis found that: 
FDI in large projects such as oil and gas, hydropower, or SEZs, 
goes through formal channels as these sectors are controlled by 
the State and entail massive investments. The remaining foreign 
investment is largely informal and involves partnerships with do-
mestic companies to facilitate land deals, such as Chinese foreign 
investment in rubber in Kachin and North Shan states, and Thai 
and Malaysian investments in palm oil development in the south-
ern Tanintharyi Region. (Scurrah, Hirsch, and Woods 2015: 14) 
Perhaps even more difficult for the GoM is whether reformers will be 
able to maintain the autonomy to challenge those who are resistant to or 
even openly blocking reform. Many of those people who resist reforms 
have benefited under the military era and treated the state’s resources as 
private resources (Jones 2014). Under the Thein Sein government, the 
challenges to reform were rooted in a political system that still funda-
mentally reflected many of the old power relations. Callahan described 
this as follows:  
In their infancy, the new political institutions of Burma reflect not 
so much the formal constitution as underlying power dynamics 
that are rooted in personal networks of loyalty and service binding 
together certain reform-minded retired and active-duty military of-
ficers, soldiers, and others who long benefited from direct military 
rule. (Callahan 2012: 123) 
For example, when the Parliamentary Land Confiscation Inquiry Com-
mission recommended that the military return about 300,000 acres of 
confiscated land across 655 cases, or about 63 per cent of the total, the 
military gave numerous reasons why the land should remain in its pos-
session. Similarly, Yuzana Company continues to be involved in a 10-
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year old dispute with communities over its 270,000 acre land concession 
in Hukawng Valley in Kachin State. In May 2015, more than 8,000 vil-
lagers from Kachin State signed a letter to the new government calling 
for its help in resolving this conflict (Irrawaddy 2016a).  
Despite these challenges to the government’s effectiveness in regu-
lating investments, this does not mean that the Myanmar government 
has no impact on foreign investments. Resorting to diplomatic means, 
the NLD government started to formalise agreements with the Chinese 
government to reign in illegal border trade. The Myanmar government 
and the Chinese government have plans to sign an agreement to stop 
illegal timber trade.35  
Given that the transition is still in its early years, the Myanmar gov-
ernment is slowly but surely gaining experience in the enforcement of 
higher investment standards. The ECD applied its laws for the first time 
in a case involving 72 businesses in Mandalay’s Industrial Zone II, ac-
cording to the lawyer representing the affected communities. 36  The 
community filed a complaint with the Mandalay regional government 
according to Article 14 of the Environmental Conversation Law. The 
Mandalay Regional Government mandated the companies to clean up 
the pollution in the rivers within six months or risk having their licences 
suspended. Each company agreed to pay MMK 700,000 each year for 
continual maintenance. 
Conclusion 
We have attempted to demonstrate how the Myanmar government, in its 
effort to strengthen its political legitimacy, has been gradually rationalis-
ing its investment regulations in early post-transition years. The govern-
ment has done this in response to a public that has become increasingly 
emboldened in terms of claiming reparations for past and ongoing injus-
tices. This context created a situation ripe for reformist policymakers to 
accept new international investment norms brought in by returning IFIs 
and TNCs. The degree to which these initiatives result in clear gains for 
communities, in terms of mitigating material and social deprivation that 
often result from unfairly negotiated investments, depends heavily on the 
ability of state reformers to make and carry out regulatory decisions 
through the state’s still-weak apparatus.  
                                                 
35  Interview with the Deputy Director General of the Forest Department, Yan-
gon, 22 December 2016. 
36  Interview with lawyer for case, Yangon, 12 December 2015. 
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In response to the convergence of these factors in Myanmar, as well 
as similar dynamics globally, the Chinese Government has started to 
make changes in the way its outbound SOEs are operating. Faced with 
setbacks and financial loses, Chinese SOEs have been engaging with 
more diverse stakeholders, conducting public relations campaigns, and 
investing to mitigate the environmental and social impacts of its invest-
ments. Despite the fact that many of these behavioural changes are in-
strumental means to achieve the aims of continued growth, we believe 
that they still present opportunities to improve from “business as usual.” 
An understanding of the openings that the transition brings can help 
Myanmar to construct an alternative sustainable path for itself going 
forward.  
A European diplomat working on dams in Myanmar commented 
that political arguments might have more sway than normative argu-
ments when it comes to influencing Chinese investment outcomes. He 
said, “Economics rules the day. We can’t compare economics to social 
and environmental issues. But there are political arguments to be.”37 
These political arguments will likely be related to an understanding of 
China’s incentives with regards to maintaining a favourable position in 
Myanmar, both economically and politically. The strength of Myanmar’s 
own political positioning will likely depend on reformers’ ability to justify 
their decisions as responding to the “will of the people,” as President 
Thein Sein did when he made his decision to halt the Myitsone Dam.  
Along with clever political manoeuvring, Myanmar will need to con-
tinue to refine its regulatory framework and administrative capacity, both 
of which will help to attract the types of capital that will prove to be 
most broadly beneficial to the development of Myanmar. Last but not 
least, to ensure that the country’s growth is shared more equitably, public 
pressure acting on state reformers must remain strong and consistent. 
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